Backend authentication architecture

// src/auth/issuer.ts
import { Issuer, generators } from 'openid-client';

export async function issueTokens(clientId: string, code: string, codeVerifier: string) {
  const issuer = await Issuer.discover(process.env.ISSUER_URL);
  const client = new issuer.Client({
    client_id: clientId,
    token_endpoint_auth_method: 'none', // Public client
  });

  const tokenSet = await client.callback(
    process.env.REDIRECT_URI,
    { code },
    { code_verifier: codeVerifier, state: generators.state() }
  );

  // Store session metadata in Redis for revocation
  await sessionStore.create({
    sessionId: tokenSet.claims().sid,
    sub: tokenSet.claims().sub,
    issuedAt: Date.now(),
    refreshTokenHash: hash(tokenSet.refresh_token!),
  });

  return {
    accessToken: tokenSet.access_token,
    refreshToken: tokenSet.refresh_token,
    expiresIn: tokenSet.expires_in,
  };
}

// src/middleware/auth.ts
import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
import { jwtVerify, createRemoteJWKSet } from 'jose';

const JWKS = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(process.env.JWKS_URI!));

export async function authMiddleware(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
  const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
  if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bea

rer ')) { return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Missing token' }); }

const token = authHeader.split(' ')[1];

try { // 1. Cryptographic validation const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWKS, { issuer: process.env.ISSUER_URL, audience: process.env.API_AUDIENCE, });

// 2. Session existence check (Revocation)
const session = await sessionStore.get(payload.sid as string);
if (!session) {
  return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session revoked' });
}

// 3. Attach user context
req.user = {
  sub: payload.sub,
  roles: payload.scope?.split(' ') || [],
  sessionId: payload.sid,
};
next();

} catch (err) { return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' }); } }

#### Step 4: Refresh Token Rotation
Refresh tokens must be rotated on every use. If a refresh token is reused, it indicates theft; the system must revoke the entire family of tokens.

```typescript
// src/auth/rotation.ts
export async function rotateRefreshToken(oldToken: string) {
  const session = await sessionStore.findByRefreshTokenHash(hash(oldToken));
  
  if (!session) {
    throw new Error('Invalid refresh token');
  }

  // Check for token reuse (theft detection)
  if (session.currentRefreshTokenHash !== hash(oldToken)) {
    // Revocation cascade
    await sessionStore.revokeFamily(session.sub);
    throw new Error('Refresh token reuse detected. Session terminated.');
  }

  // Issue new tokens
  const newRefreshToken = generateSecureRandom();
  await sessionStore.update(session.sessionId, {
    currentRefreshTokenHash: hash(newRefreshToken),
    lastUsed: Date.now(),
  });

  return {
    accessToken: issueAccessToken(session),
    refreshToken: newRefreshToken,
  };
}

Architecture Decisions

• RS256 over HS256: Asymmetric signing allows resource servers to validate tokens without sharing secrets, reducing the blast radius of key compromise.
• Opaque Refresh Tokens: Refresh tokens are never parsed by resource servers. They are opaque handles to the session store, preventing data leakage and enabling immediate revocation.
• Redis Session Store: Provides sub-millisecond lookups for validation and atomic operations for rotation logic. TTLs ensure automatic cleanup of expired sessions.
• Short-Lived Access Tokens: 15-minute expiry limits the window of exploitation for stolen tokens, while refresh rotation maintains user experience.

Pitfall Guide

1. Storing Tokens in localStorage:

   • Mistake: Frontend stores JWTs in localStorage.
   • Impact: Vulnerable to XSS. Any script running on the page can exfiltrate tokens.
   • Fix: Use HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict cookies for token storage, or implement a token exchange flow where the frontend never touches the raw token.

2. Ignoring aud and iss Validation:

   • Mistake: Validating signature but not claims.
   • Impact: Token confusion attacks. A token issued for Service A can be used on Service B.
   • Fix: Strictly validate iss (issuer) and aud (audience) in middleware. Ensure audience values are unique per service.

3. Race Conditions in Refresh Rotation:

   • Mistake: Concurrent refresh requests overwrite each other, causing token desynchronization.
   • Impact: Legitimate users are logged out unexpectedly.
   • Fix: Use distributed locks (e.g., Redis SET NX) around the rotation logic or implement a grace period for recently used tokens.

4. Excessive JWT Payload Size:

   • Mistake: Embedding user profiles or large role lists in the JWT.
   • Impact: Increased latency, header size limits exceeded, and stale data.
   • Fix: Keep JWTs minimal. Use sub and scope. Fetch user details from the user service via sub when needed.

5. Lack of Rate Limiting on Auth Endpoints:

   • Mistake: Allowing unlimited login or token refresh attempts.
   • Impact: Credential stuffing and brute-force attacks.
   • Fix: Implement strict rate limiting on /login, /token, and /refresh endpoints based on IP and user identifier.

6. CSRF on Stateless APIs:

   • Mistake: Assuming JWTs prevent CSRF.
   • Impact: If tokens are stored in cookies, cross-site request forgery is possible.
   • Fix: Use SameSite=Strict cookies, implement CSRF tokens for state-changing requests, or use the Double Submit Cookie pattern.

7. Static JWKS Rotation:

   • Mistake: Hardcoding public keys or failing to rotate keys.
   • Impact: If a private key is compromised, all tokens are forgeable.
   • Fix: Use dynamic JWKS fetching with caching. Rotate signing keys periodically and ensure the IdP publishes new keys before old ones expire.

Production Bundle

Action Checklist

• Enforce HTTPS: All auth endpoints and token transmission must use TLS 1.2+.
• Implement PKCE: Require PKCE for all client applications, including SPAs and mobile apps.
• Configure CORS: Restrict Access-Control-Allow-Origin to specific trusted domains; never use *.
• Enable Refresh Rotation: Ensure refresh tokens are single-use and rotated on every exchange.
• Add Audit Logging: Log all authentication events, failures, and token revocations with correlation IDs.
• Set Token Lifespans: Access tokens ≤ 15 minutes; Refresh tokens ≤ 30 days with sliding expiration.
• Test Revocation: Verify that revoking a session immediately invalidates active access tokens.
• Secure Cookies: If using cookies, set HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict, and appropriate Domain/Path.

Decision Matrix

Scenario	Recommended Approach	Why	Cost Impact
Internal Microservices	mTLS + Short-lived JWT	Service-to-service trust; low latency; no user interaction.	Low (Infrastructure overhead)
Public Web App (SPA)	Session-Backed JWT + HttpOnly Cookies	XSS mitigation; instant revocation; standard UX.	Medium (Redis session store)
Mobile App	OIDC + Refresh Token Rotation	Native storage security; background refresh; offline capability.	Low (Client-side storage)
High-Security Finance	OIDC + Step-up Auth + MFA	Strict identity assurance; regulatory compliance; risk-based auth.	High (MFA providers, complexity)
Legacy Migration	Adapter Pattern + JWT Wrapper	Bridge legacy session stores to modern JWT flows without rewrite.	Medium (Dev effort)

Configuration Template

Docker Compose for Local Auth Stack:

version: '3.8'
services:
  keycloak:
    image: quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:23.0
    command: start-dev
    environment:
      KEYCLOAK_ADMIN: admin
      KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD: admin
    ports:
      - "8080:8080"
    volumes:
      - ./realm-export.json:/opt/keycloak/data/import/realm.json

  redis:
    image: redis:7-alpine
    ports:
      - "6379:6379"
    command: redis-server --requirepass ${REDIS_PASSWORD}

  api:
    build: .
    environment:
      ISSUER_URL: http://localhost:8080/realms/codcompass
      JWKS_URI: http://keycloak:8080/realms/codcompass/protocol/openid-connect/certs
      REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD}@redis:6379
      API_AUDIENCE: backend-api
    ports:
      - "3000:3000"
    depends_on:
      - keycloak
      - redis

TypeScript Auth Config Interface:

// src/config/auth.config.ts
export interface AuthConfig {
  issuer: string;
  jwksUri: string;
  audience: string;
  accessTokenTTL: number; // seconds
  refreshTokenTTL: number; // seconds
  sessionStore: {
    type: 'redis' | 'memory';
    url: string;
    ttl: number;
  };
  cookie: {
    httpOnly: boolean;
    secure: boolean;
    sameSite: 'strict' | 'lax' | 'none';
    maxAge: number;
  };
}

export const authConfig: AuthConfig = {
  issuer: process.env.ISSUER_URL!,
  jwksUri: process.env.JWKS_URI!,
  audience: process.env.API_AUDIENCE!,
  accessTokenTTL: 15 * 60,
  refreshTokenTTL: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60,
  sessionStore: {
    type: 'redis',
    url: process.env.REDIS_URL!,
    ttl: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60,
  },
  cookie: {
    httpOnly: true,
    secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
    sameSite: 'strict',
    maxAge: 15 * 60 * 1000,
  },
};

Quick Start Guide

1. Initialize Environment: Run docker compose up -d to start Keycloak and Redis. Import the realm configuration to set up clients and scopes.

2. Install Dependencies: Execute npm install jose openid-client redis express. Ensure TypeScript types are installed for strict typing.

3. Configure Auth Middleware: Copy the authMiddleware and rotation logic into your project. Update auth.config.ts with your environment variables pointing to the local Docker services.

4. Test Token Flow: Use a tool like Postman to request a token via the Authorization Code flow with PKCE. Verify the JWT structure, validate the signature against the JWKS, and confirm the session is created in Redis.

5. Validate Protection: Attempt to access a protected endpoint with an expired token and a revoked session ID. Ensure the middleware returns 401 Unauthorized with appropriate error messages.